Rhiza Labs FluTracker Forum

Silence of WHO on the two recent trH3N2 (A/West Virginia/06/2011) and trH1N2 (A/Minnesota/19/2011) cases is deafening

http://www.who.int/csr/don/en/index.html

No news is bad news

http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option ... temid=2291

In EW 49, CDC3 reported two infections due to swine-origin influenza A virus in two children from two different states (Minnesota and West Virginia). One patient was infected by a novel influenza A/H1N2 and the other one by a novel influenza A/H3N2. Both patients recovered. Both viruses are known to circulate in the swine population in the United States and health authorities of both states have been tracing the contacts of the cases and looking for possible sources of the exposure. Thus far, no additional cases have been detected and no swine contact has been reported.

http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option ... temid=2469

In EW 49, CDC3 reported two infections due to swine-origin influenza A virus in two children from two different states (Minnesota and West Virginia). One patient was infected by a novel influenza A/H1N2 and the other one by a novel influenza A/H3N2. Both patients recovered. Both viruses are known to circulate in the swine population in the United States and health authorities of both states have been tracing the contacts of the cases and looking for possible sources of the exposure. Thus far, no additional cases have been detected and no swine contact has been reported.

http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option ... temid=2469

WHO has a FUNDAMENTAL misunderstanding of what is and what is not in public swine sequences.

ECDC THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR THE EU
In the context of the swine-origin triple reassortant A(H3N2) viruses, since November 2010 ECDC has been
collaborating with the Community Network of Reference Laboratories (CNRL) for Human Influenza in Europe and
the WHO Collaborating Centre specifically to address the diagnostic aspects of these viruses. This year, the
capability of European influenza reference laboratories to detect swine-origin triple reassortant viruses has been
assessed. It was shown that there is good capacity to detect SOIVtrH3N2-M viruses as influenza A viruses but with
restricted capability to subtype these viruses. Therefore it is important that all these viruses should be sent to the
WHO Collaborating Centre in London.
Diagnostic RT-PCR for generic influenza A virus (targeted to the M-gene) will detect swine-origin triple reassortant
A(H3N2) viruses as human influenza A. However, the subtype-specific RT-PCR for either H3 or N2 of human
influenza A viruses will most probably have a decreased sensitivity or will result in no detection of the SO-A(H3N2)
viruses. Probes directed against other genes, e.g. the nucleoprotein gene as was used during the early phase of
the 2009 pandemic caused by the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, will enable preliminary differentiation between human
seasonal H3N2 viruses and these zoonotic H3N2 viruses. Therefore, swine-origin specific subtype RT-PCR,
antigenic characterisation, and partial or full genome sequencing are the most appropriate techniques to
distinguish between the human and these new zoonotic-origin influenza viruses.
The European influenza reference laboratories (National Influenza Centres or NICs) are aware of the detection
challenges and a number are updating their detection protocols to be able to make this distinction. Additionally, a
survey has been distributed to all remaining influenza reference laboratories in EU/EEA countries to understand the
existing strategies for detection of these viruses across national laboratories. Results of this survey are under
analysis. In addition a simple on-line survey is being undertaken to determine if and how NICs can detect the
newer virus with its M-gene from A(H1N1)pdm09.

http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publicatio ... merica.pdf