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PostPosted: Sun Nov 23, 2014 6:05 am 
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Conservation groups such as Compassion in World Farming (CIWF) continue to deny role of wild birds in transmission of avian influenza, including H5N8.

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PostPosted: Sun Nov 23, 2014 6:06 am 
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"AVIAN FLU IS NOT CAUSED BY WILD BIRDS'
The outbreak of bird flu is not due to wild birds, says animal welfare organization Compassion in World Farming (CIWF). The H5N8 virus, according to the organization not found in wild birds in Europe.

"Moreover, the affected companies in the Netherlands have no outlet to the outside. The animals are always inside. "
CIWF points intensive poultry farming to blame, reports news agency Novum.

"It is known that intensive farming with her full stables, where sometimes tens of thousands of chickens close to each other, an ideal breeding ground for the spread of animal diseases. When sick in such a stable one animal sick with a contagious virus soon many more animals. "
The organization finds it remarkable that is directly pointed to wild birds. Director Geert Laugs:

"It is remarkable how the proponents of intensive farming hasten wild birds to designate as the cause of outbreaks and require a free-range chicken with large parts of the year, during migration, are kept inside."
CIWF believes that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the origin of the virus.


http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/11/21/der ... -het-land/

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PostPosted: Sun Nov 23, 2014 6:13 am 
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TVNZ tonight takes literally and without comment text portions of an afternoon at the end of the press release sent by Compassion in World Farming. CIWF sets in that wild birds to be easily identified as culprits for the H5N8 outbreaks Netherlands this week startle The full text of the press release of CIWF is: ALLEGATION THAT WILD BIRDS ON AVIAN FLU DID IS PREMATURE It is premature and the current outbreaks of highly questionable to pathogenic avian influenza in the Netherlands due to wild birds, takes animal welfare organization Compassion in World Farming (CIWF) CIWF finds it too early to draw definitive conclusions but puts big question marks when it is assumed that wild birds brought the virus:. The birds deadly H5N8 virus comes from Asia and so far not been found in wild birds in Europe. In addition, the companies affected in the Netherlands have no outlet to the outside. The animals are always inside. Until now there are no companies with spout affected by bird flu. Avian influenza viruses that are transmitted by wild birds are generally of mild, low-pathogenic type. The animals are hardly sick. Wild birds are a highly pathogenic virus rarely encountered It is known that intensive farming with her ​​full stables, where sometimes tens of thousands of chickens close to each other, an ideal breeding ground for the spread of animal diseases. When sick in such a stable one animal sick with a contagious virus soon many more animals. In addition, there is a high probability that, under these circumstances, the virus mutates to a variant more dangerous for humans and animals. This was the case in the Netherlands in 2003 when a low-pathogenic virus on a business mutated to the dangerous highly pathogenic H7N7 variant. It is known that the bird flu virus is easily within the cattle industry can spread, eg the transport of manure infected chickens or the use of inadequately disinfected crates or trucks. "It is remarkable how the proponents of intensive farming hasten wild birds to designate as the cause of outbreaks and to require that hens with free range large parts of the year, during migration, are held within the current outbreak shows in the Netherlands, how serious the situation is, not give rise to such Draconian measures, "says Geert Laugs, director of CIWF-Netherlands". Of course we have no objection to the temporary indoor confinement which is now in force and which serves to prevent further expansion of bird flu, "he adds. Actually incorrect ... As Foodlog earlier this week made ​​clear by a round of experts, is the suggestion that Launched by CIWF incorrect. If it would prevent highly pathogenic and deadly H5N8 in stalls, the NVWA there would have been immediately informed. The fact of the message should be rejected. That is a blemish on the blazon knowledge of the organization. The level of information of the NGO is clearly insufficient. ... But not unfairly That does not mean that CIWF indeed touches on a sore spot. In a densely populated country like the Netherlands, uncertainty about the reasons behind the cascade of N5H8 has fallen in closed farms fatal. The risk from animals to humans about catching diseases does not show real and imaginary Pathogens - a distant word. Pathogens - appear to migrate through almost completely unfamiliar roads over the world. It is now clear that H5N8 comes with a high degree of certainty from Asia. About the hosts during the journey here we grope still completely in the dark. The same applies to the way the virus came in closed stables; the cause may be sought in human negligence but also unavoidable risks. CIWF throws first NGOs stone to carry the risk discussion, even though it would have been better if the stone would make less suggestive and factual ripples in the pond. Uncertainty is killing at the moment the Dutch chicken farming Photo Credits:. CIWF

http://www.foodlog.nl/short-news/detail ... erij-zelf/

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PostPosted: Thu Nov 27, 2014 11:38 am 
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Zoonotic Ecology and Epidemiology
Of ducks and men
Image

A German Teal and some epidemiological hand waiving
Posted on November 27, 2014
A teal - stunning little bird. But also at present in the center of H5N8 flu business. (Picture from http://www.rspb.org.uk/).

By Jonas Waldenström

As most of you know by now, we have a new highly pathogenic avian flu virus in our midst. This virus, of the H5N8 subtype, has been detected in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in the last two weeks.

The epidemiology of highly pathogenic viruses is quite different from that of their low pathogenic cousins. While low pathogenic viruses are essentially waterfowl viruses, and generally benign, highly pathogenic viruses tend to mainly go rampage in domestic poultry, and are not disseminated broadly in wild bird populations. One important exception is/was the H5N1 virus, that apart from affecting the poultry industry also caused several outbreaks among wild birds in Europe in 2005-2006, but with varying pathogenicity in different avian species.

The new H5N8 virus entered the European scene quite unexpectedly. The closest described outbreak before Germany was Southeast Asia, where this virus had been detected in poultry (and some wild birds) in Korea, China and Japan. That’s quite a leap for a microbe, nearly halfway around the globe.

Phylogenetic studies have confirmed that the current outbreak strain is genetically highly similar to the virus from Asia. Thus the question is really: how the heck did it get here? Officials from OIE and others were quick to point the gun at wild birds. But regardless of how well we know that waterfowl can be hosts of low pathogenic viruses, and that some species can harbor highly pathogenic viruses asymptomatically, there are no direct migration routes in autumn between the two areas. Thus, if the virus entered Europe via wild waterfowl it must either been around in wild bird populations for a longer time, allowing sequential transmission between different populations/species at shared breeding or stopover sites, or there might have been undetected outbreaks in poultry further west (e.g. Russia) where virus has disseminated into wild bird populations migrating westward. Neither do we know how this particular virus affects wild birds – is pathogenic to waterfowl, does it interfere with migration, how long do infected birds shed virus, etc?

An alternative hypothesis, of course, is that it has reached Europe as part of the trade with poultry and products. After all, the chicken is the most common migratory bird on the planet, although it doesn’t fly on its own wings.

The ‘chicken vs. duck’ argument is an inflamed old discussion, where different people tend to have polarized positions. In my opinion, a middle stance is more appropriate. Likely, both wild birds and poultry can affect geographic spread of highly pathogenic viruses, but the circumstances may act differently from case to case.

The biggest problem at present is our lack of data. A few days ago, the H5N8 virus was identified in a Teal shot as part of active surveillance in Germany. Depending on your preferences, this finding in a healthy duck (that’s at least what the reports say) could either be a ‘game changer’, providing evidence for a link to wild birds, or a spillover event from poultry to wild birds.

Instead of arguing based on a single Teal, we need to gather much more data. And do so quickly. We should ramp up active surveillance in both poultry and wild birds. During the H5N1 years, a network of ornithologists and virologists was created that substantially contributed to the increased knowledge base on influenza A virus epidemiology and ecology. This network was mostly dismantled when the H5N1 virus disappeared from the European scene, but the core is still there and would be easy to gear up again.

Let’s do that, shall we?

http://zoonoticecology.wordpress.com/20 ... d-waiving/

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PostPosted: Mon Dec 01, 2014 6:04 am 
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H5N8: About dirty practices and dirty fantasies

11.26.2014: With make heavy mine give politicians information about the seriousness of the situation on the H5N8 front, and reflexively takes the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institute (FLI) of Riems (at Rügen) again the wild birds as dangerous carriers of avian influenza H5N8 virus to target. And finally, within Rügen a teal was shot, which was in itself H5N8. "Teals are considered to be highly mobile and set distances of up to 8,000 kilometers. They live, according to Minister Backhaus in large numbers on Lake Baikal in Siberia. Animals then were observed in South Korea and they were flying also to Europe." So the nightmare scenario drawn from the Ministry of Agriculture Meck-Pomm. That teals are native breeding birds and also never mix with poultry, disappears.

South Korea is currently considered the country most affected by H5N8. H5N8 was detected in a short time on poultry farms in Meck-Pomm, in the Netherlands and in the south of England. Prof. Dr. Mette Head of FLI had publicly fantasized to himself that wild birds brought the virus with stages have infections on the part of South Korea across Asia after Germany and the Netherlands, and have brought about Iceland to England. This nonsense FLI has since been removed from the network, but wild birds still remain in focus, the shot Teal was "thanks".

The bungling epidemiology of FLI is not suitable to laugh, cry more, because it addresses a lot of damage. As previously for H5N1, so it is again non-governmental organizations that bring light into the darkness epidemiological. The Science Forum avian influenza (WAI, press release of 20/11/2014) found that in southern England H5N8 on the duck farm Driffield was found that belongs to the company Cherry Valley Farms Ltd., the narrow claims to trade links with duck farms in the H5N8 epidemic area South Korea maintains. In Germany, the company maintains a duck farm in Wriezen (Brandenburg). The shortest road route from Driffield Wriezen runs directly past the Dutch Hekendorp place where the H5N8 affected by Dutch company is located. On the road between East Asia and Germany, not a single wild bird, in spite 10,000 samples investigated in the context of a wild bird monitoring since 2006 with dangerous bird flu found, not even to large recreation areas. Conclusion: The speculations of the FLI are unfounded, the poultry industry (including their transportation, for example, to slaughterhouses) must be targeted epidemiologists, not the wild birds.

A miracle would be if the FLI had not been determined, the findings from the WAI itself. What could the FLI then move on retaining the wild bird hypothesis for the dissemination of H5N8? Looking for an answer a detective would first find a suitable subject. One such item is available in fact: The image of the German poultry industry should not be damaged, and works best when wild birds are portrayed as containing H5N8. In return, the FLI was earlier, according to the H5N1 theater, showered with almost Research million. That would be a subject again to get research million. Let's see if there is some truth to the design it. Another explanation could be that the researchers in the FLI are just plain stupid. This is not to be expected. You just want to keep only the vest of industrial poultry farmers clean.

But the vest is dirty ad nauseum. As dirty, Werner Hupperich found out about the WAI (Press Release dated 11.25.2014) in an interview with a former turkey shippers, who drove within a loading teams battle mature turkeys in transport cages and invited them onto the truck. Hair-raising details came to light. Was loaded into the night from 22 clock. The truck drove per night through five to six turkey farms, before he finally reached the slaughterhouse at its 200-kilometer route. On the truck there was probably vents, but no filter. Since die during transport to the slaughterhouse around five percent of turkey, freshly dead, still warm turkey were often loaded. If dead turkeys were already cold, they were left lying on the fattening farm. If had enough time between the loading on the fattening farm and arrival at the slaughterhouse at six clock, a catch was traveling inserted, for example in motorway service stations or truck stops. The shipper contributed throughout the layer short sleeve cotton overalls made easier through their everyday clothing. Opportunity to wash hands after loading did not exist. Toilets were not visited, necessities had to be done outdoors. It was not until after the end subjected to shippers from their violent smelling overall and were able to make at home under the shower.

About the poultry industry such Noisy HP FLI does not say anything. But it is precisely this Noisy HP are ideal for the spatial distribution of all possible pathogens. The Noisy HP by truck can be spread over some 100 kilometers by air from continent to continent, and if the Noisy HP H5N8 bird flu virus or related contain dirty fantasies of the FLI are excited, and then the politicians are pelted with dirt gedanklichem , And the ordinary citizens of dirt hoodwink as a preventive health care. Yuck!

Sievert Lorenzen

http://provieh.de/h5n8-ueber-schmutzige ... phantasien

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PostPosted: Tue Dec 02, 2014 11:13 am 
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Bird flu: chickens are coming home to roost Columns December 1, 2014

The Dutch poultry industry has been hit by an outbreak of avian flu, which has been identified on several farms. But don’t blame migratory birds for the failures of the livestock industry, writes biologist and animal welfare campaigner Sjourd van de Wouw. In the last couple of days the government’s extermination service had its work cut out. Hundreds of thousands of chickens on contaminated chicken farms were gassed. The Dutch culling policy is a world-wide standard. As far afield as China delegations from the Dutch livestock industry are trying to flog this particular expertise. It’s a cynical by-product of the many diseases – bird flu, swine fever, Q fever and foot and mouth disease among them – which have plagued the Dutch livestock industry in the last decades. Apart from clinging to this efficient culling process, the livestock industry also abides by dangerous and antiquated principles. It seems it has learned very little from earlier outbreaks. This is bad for the animals and, ultimately, bad for the industry itself. Almost every farmer or farmers’ representative is singing from the same hymn sheet these days: it’s those dangerous migrating birds that are visiting the disease on a helpless industry. Chickens shouldn’t roam free, they say, although outbreaks occurred at six chicken farms in north west Europe where the animals were kept indoors. Scientists from the Royal Dutch Academy of Science (KNAW) are exasperated at the industry’s making scapegoats of migrating birds as there is no evidence whatsoever to support their claim. Time bomb And even if the evidence were there it would not exonerate the industry. Contamination and culls are a choice, not an inevitability. The sector and the government are consistently going for the wrong option. The sector is sitting on a time bomb. There are some hundred million chickens in the Netherlands. No other country has so many chickens caged up on such a small surface. They are also concentrated in two neighbouring regions: the Peel and the Gelderse Vallei. In the words of an epidemiologist from Wageningen university: ‘The proximity between the farms and the number of chickens means an outbreak in one single farm would be the end of the whole valley. That is the problem.’ What we should do then is scale down the livestock industry. Cows, chicken and pigs are vaccinated against a number of diseases but bird flu is not one of them. Vaccinations cost money. Some buyers don’t want meat from vaccinated animals and that, too, is money lost to the sector. On the other hand, the financial hardships caused by outbreaks are largely compensated by the government. All in all, it’s cheaper not to vaccinate the animals. Health risks aside, culling on this scale is unacceptable to society. Pointing the finger at migrating birds, as the livestock industry and some politicians are doing, is ridiculous. It’s time the industry was organised in such a way as to make sure that a single virus doesn’t spell the end of thousands of animals, farms and possibly the entire sector. Sjoerd van de Wouw is a biologist and campaigner at animal welfare organisation Wakker Dier This opinion piece appeared earlier in the Volkskrant

Read more at DutchNews.nl: Bird flu: chickens are coming home to roost http://www.dutchnews.nl/features/2014/1 ... roost.php/

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PostPosted: Sat Dec 06, 2014 1:45 pm 
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Dr. Peter Petermann for WAI

Netherlands: No Evidence that Wild Birds are spreading Avian Influenza ! (PDF)

After a series of outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian Influenza H5N8 (HPAI H5N8) in poultry holdings in the Netherlands (1), the Dutch authorities have recently reported two H5N8-HPAI-positive samples supposedly from feces of two wild ducks, widgeons (Anas penelope) (2). This has been regarded as evidence, that wild birds are responsible for the introduction of H5N8-HPAI from East Asia and for their further spread through western Europe (2, 3).

However, these two samples obviously do not constitute a proof for the wild-bird hypothesis.

The Dutch authorities have so far (Dec. 4th 2014) failed to publish a comprehensive report about the circumstances of the sampling of duck feces. It thus remains mysterious how they can be sure that the samples are really from two different birds. As in former outbreaks in several European countries, there is an irritating lack of transparency in the epidemiological investigations (see as an outstanding example 4).

What is known so far must raise doubts on the suggested interpretation:

First, these H5N8-positive samples were taken considerable time AFTER the outbreaks were detected (Dec. 1st). Accepting a reasonable incubation time, the wild ducks would have been infected only after the first outbreak was reported (Nov. 18th 2014). In more than 1.500 wild bird samples taken BEFORE the poultry outbreaks in the Netherlands, no HPAI was detected (2). Unknown sample numbers were analysed in neighbouring countries, with just one H5N8-positive sample in Germany, found likewise only AFTER the detection of an outbreak in poultry in the same province (according to different sources it was either an unidentified duck, 5, or a Common Teal, Anas crecca, 6).

Second, the samples were taken in the region of outbreaks in chicken farms (affected farms are between 11 and 25 km to the south and west of the sample site at Kamerik, Utrecht; 1). It is an obvious possibility that the infection of wild birds may have been caused in some way by the outbreaks in poultry farms.

Third, Widgeons use to graze on farmland, where they may have come into contact with poultry manure used as fertilizer. As long as no report on the sample protocol und laboratory tests is available it can't even be ruled out that the samples of duck feces may have been contaminated in situ by poultry manure containing virus, in which case the ducks may not even have been infected.

Fourth, in South Korea considerable numbers of wild ducks have died during the outbreaks in poultry farms (7, 8). Though the virus has apparently not changed genetically, there is no sign of raised wild bird mortality in Europa so far. This is obvious evidence against a widespread circulation of HPAI among wild ducks, which would be necessary to explain the serie of wide-spaced outbreaks in poultry holding. However, if the outbreaks can not be contained soon, the probability of a spread to wild birds will undoubtedly increase.

Fifth, as the source of the virus introduction into the poultry holdings is obviously not yet known, it seems reasonable to assume, that an as yet unknown common source may be responsible for both the poultry outbreaks and the infection of wild ducks.

There are several ways the HPAI-virus could spread from farm to farm, ways that would not be detectable in retrospective epidemiological investigations. Just as one example, road transport of asymptomatically infected birds could spread virus by scattering contaminated feathers along the road. Ducks are notorious for not showing symptoms when infected with HPAI. It should be kept in mind, that outbreaks in duck holdings may pass unnoticed, sometimes for many weeks (as in Germany in 2007; 10).

However, it can not be expected that the way the virus has spread can ever be reconstructed in detail. With luck, genetic analyses of the virus gene sequences may at least give some hints about the way the outbreaks are connected. Unfortunately, European virus gene sequences are now "published" on the GISAID data base (9), which is not open to the interested public (despite claims to the contrary).

Sources

1) http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public%5C..% ... 103516.pdf
2) http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten- ... -2014.html
3) http://www.expatica.com/nl/news/country ... 41321.html
4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Berna ... 1_outbreak
5) http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public%5C..% ... 170741.pdf
6) http://www.fli.bund.de/fileadmin/dam_up ... bewertung_ 20141125.pdf
7) http://www.wildlifedisease.org/wda/Port ... Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds H5N8 HPAI 28 Jan....pdf
8) http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/21/2/14-1268_article
9) http://platform.gisaid.org/epi3/frontend#1d5a29
10) FLI (17.12.2007, 12.00 Uhr): Epidemiologisches Bulletin Nr. 10/2007. Lagebericht zur Aviären Influenza.- 13 S. (apparently no longer posted on the internet-site of FLI: http://www.fli.bund.de/)

http://www.wai.netzwerk-phoenix.net/ind ... edit&id=85

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PostPosted: Sat Dec 06, 2014 2:41 pm 
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Important Note: The Open Letter is here available as a PDF.

Open letter

! Avian Influenza: No reflexive lobes
Second Open Letter of the Science Forum avian influenza WAI Around 32,000 poultry animals were culled in the past two weeks in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern - 31,000 in an industrial operation and 1,000 living with self-catering and breed poultry breeders. Cause of culling was that of the avian influenza virus H5N8 detection in a turkey fattening farm. None of the sampled immediately before the preventive killing of poultry in the exclusion zone around the site of infection had the H5N8 virus. The Board of the Science Forum avian influenza (WAI) urges the competent authorities and political leaders,






to explain how the diagnosis of "avian flu" came about, and
to explain why the killing of poultry animals were kept in the exclusion zone in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern necessary, and
to ensure that the alarm schedule avian Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is maintained in force since 2007, as amended, under which life passed should be disinfected with Brannt-erase lime from infected herds in the environment to prevent the spread of viruses, eg by wild birds.

The legal situation
The German avian Regulation does not prescribe in § 21, that in case of detection of avian virus all poultry must be culled, which lives at the site of infection around in less than 10 km radius amount flyback zone. The Regulation provides that poultry are slaughtered in the restricted area "can ... if this is necessary for reasons of animal disease control, especially for the immediate removal of any infection."
The Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, German Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza and responsible for risk estimation of risks to animal diseases, writes in his latest brochure about highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses: "According to official findings of the disease, the affected poultry in an operation is killed and transported directly to disposal facilities. The operation is then professionally cleaned and disinfected. The movement of people, animals and goods is banned or restricted in an applied to the outbreak surveillance and protection zone "The need for culling does not mention the FLI.. Established polluter The FAO has established in 2007 with continued validity according to the current state of research " Many virologists believe that the virus (n. d. AV .: H5N1) developed by the activities of Geflügelzucht- and production and then jumped to wild birds. ... While it can not be ruled out an entry by wild birds, but a more established explanation are imports . of poultry and contaminated trays and crates of eggs for hatching and dissemination by workers and equipment " The FLI writes in his pamphlet into HPAI: " The spread to other stocks carried out by the pet trade or indirectly through contaminated (dirty) vehicles, people, equipment, packaging material or the like. ... In rare cases of avian influenza may also arise from initially only low pathogenic viruses that are spread in wild birds, especially waterfowl world. After transmission of low pathogenic influenza viruses of subtype H5 or H7 in poultry, the virus may increase by changing its genome the pathogenic properties leaps and bounds and lead to the outbreak of avian influenza. "





The fact is, hatching eggs and day travel worldwide frequently a thousand times around as migratory birds and have much better access to stables as wild birds.


Anonymous polluter
In the current case, citing the press, the FLI with the statement that the transmission of H5N8 by the wild birds might have led to the infection in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. The rebuttal is not to lead. After all, the FLI now focused on the more established causes and thus has learned from the experience of the human pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1. When in 2006 was first identified in a German poultry-keeping H5N1, presented the FLI as an indication of the likely transmission from wild birds, an H5N1 positive wild bird was found dead removed several days after the outbreak and 180 km from the site of infection. endanger human ago Ebola and the human swine flu was the transmissible to humans avian influenza virus H5N1 pandemic threatening most pathogens. H5N8, common in some Asian countries, human pathogenic potential is attributed to human infection but is not yet proven. The H5N1 statistics of the World Health Organization reported 667 human cases, of which 393 fatal went out from the beginning of counting 2003 to the present. Every death is one too many, and in view of the unknown number of infected and ill patients who remained untested. Conversely, no one knows how many of the billion people in the Asian epidemic areas had contact with H5N1, without becoming infected or develop symptoms. Epidemiologists and virologists believe that there are many. Individual cases of infected asymptomatic workers in poultry farms have been reported in Japan and Korea. According to the current state of knowledge of the WAI WHO has made ​​no effort to make the frequency of symptomless infections estimate secured by the audit. Disease and test-disease Positive results of serological or molecular diagnostic detection methods are independent of the pathogenicity of the virus is no evidence of the onset of avian influenza. In other words: that of a poultry animal probably virus-specific antibodies or gene segments were an influenza virus found in samples does not justify the diagnosis of avian influenza. Consequently, the German avian Regulation for the early detection of this disease from clinical signs and requires a poultry farmer only at unusually high animal or power losses, a message, and to demonstrate that the stock is free from avian influenza viruses. If an influenza virus detected without meeting these criteria, a test-disease must be considered. According to the FLI is in the currently affected infection, a squat with about 31,000 animals turkeys stall, the death rate had increased since the beginning of November be. In addition had occurred in foreign stocks with H5N8-detecting symptoms of avian influenza. Because infection itself may have little or no non-specific symptoms result with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, other primary or secondary pathogens are excluded in the differential diagnosis. The WAI is not known whether the FLI has made ​​available results of histopathological studies on the cause of death of the currently affected turkeys to the public. slaughter and destruction - harmless? The German avian Regulation stipulates that after the detection of avian influenza virus culled the affected stock and carcasses are disposed of. The culling of other stocks can be arranged (see The legal situation). The terms "culling" and "destruction" give a feeling of security. But the opposite is the case: increase culls and carcass transports the risk of the spread of viruses from infection in the exclusion zone. A well-supervised quarantine does not increase this risk. This is not a view but a fact. Influenza viruses, regardless of type, into the air and the environment shall be transported by means of wind, birds, rodents and insects, and can not be effectively prevented from entering into stables. Because of this fact is known, is not culled in the durchseuchten regular way with influenza viruses swine herds even at exceptionally high mortality. Be infected pigs, because they develop symptoms treated to prevent secondary bacterial infections.
















The harmful effects of culling by avian influenza were apparently in the Netherlands. There were 30 million poultry in 2003, according to a avian influenza outbreak in a laying hens operation, culled, including 180,000 healthy poultry animals of self-sufficient and lovers. An investigation revealed later: Especially the mass culling - of this dust raised and the transport of carcasses across the country - had spread the avian influenza virus H7N7. The punished The current culling of poultry animals in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is neither legally a constraint still epidemiologically useful still cause justice as it relates to poultry from self-sufficient and lovers. The poultry industry is suffering from a virus that is mainly caused by their production methods and distributed, and shall receive culling compensation from the Tierseuchenkasse. self and poultry lovers who in still produce or disseminate usually neither avian influenza viruses are pathogenic to humans or antibiotic-resistant pathogens, be punished twice. On the one hand, because every small holder by means of obligation to contribute in the Tierseuchenkasse for compensation to the poultry industry is level. On the other hand, because according to Animal Health Act up to 50, - € per registered poultry animal may be paid, which was culled. Even this statutory maximum amount that can be raised only by ordinance of the Ministry with the consent of the Bundesrat corresponds, often neither the ideal nor, on rare poultry breeds, the material value of the animal. Apart from the Board of WAI following persons support the concern of this letter (the list is regularly www.wai.netzwerk-phoenix.net added):







Dr. med. Vet. Claudia Preuss Ueberschär
Anja Marohn
Philipp Fröning
Anke Haegele, vet
club animal & human eV
Andrea Hagen Locher, veterinarian
Dr. med. vet. Hiltrud Strasser
Hannah Brown, veterinarian
Dr. med. vet. Eva Maria twilight
Dr. med. vet Ines advena
Kirsten Tönnies, vet
Heidi Stümges, Vet
Animal Spirit eV
Franz Plank, veterinarian
Dr. vet. med. Burkhard Bauer
Dr. Friedhelm Berger, Argrarwissenschaftler
Corinna Orthey
Elizabeth Petras, 1st Chairman PACT eV
Sybille and Julia Stöckmann, KiJu Farm Speckenhof (Bönen)
Karin Ulich, vet (Sigmaringen)

http://www.wai.netzwerk-phoenix.net/ind ... edit&id=82

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PostPosted: Sun Dec 07, 2014 4:10 pm 
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Statement on H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Poultry and Wild Birds
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04-Dec-2014
In response to the recent H5N8 outbreaks and speculation about the role of wild birds, the UN Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds (of which Wetlands International is a member) released a statement to inform stakeholders about the potential interaction between wild birds and H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) virus and appropriate ways of taking action. The statement highlights the need to protect wild birds and wetland areas as part of disease control measures. View the statement.
Flyway maps show direct migration from East Asia to West Europe would be highly unusual
To inform stakeholders about the most recent H5N8 developments, in the weeks following the outbreak Wetlands International, in collaboration with its waterbird Specialist Groups, has mobilised information about the migration and populations of relevant wild bird species and visualised that in so-called Flyway Maps. These demonstrate the north-south nature of normal migratory movements within semi-distinct flyway regions and helps appreciate the likelihood (or the lack thereof) of a direct movement from East Asia to West Europe within one migration season.


Common teal flyway population boundaries. Click here for a larger image.
Our work on Avian Influenza and wild birds
Since the major outbreaks of HPAI in poultry in Asia in 2004 and the move to (Western) Europe in 2005 and 2006, in which wild birds were involved and affected, Wetlands International has played a leading role in helping to understand the migratory movements of wild birds to inform decision making about appropriate management of HPAI. We are active in supporting national governments, international unions (like the EU), international organisations, conventions and other stakeholders with information about the potential role of wild birds in the manifestation of HPAI.
Wetlands International is seeking support to further develop flyway maps, both in terms of covering more species and in terms of improving the individual maps. If you would like to use these maps or support our mapping efforts, please contact:
Dr. Taej Mundkur
Taej.Mundkur@wetlands.org
+31 318 660910

http://www.wetlands.org/News/tabid/66/I ... Birds.aspx

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PostPosted: Sun Dec 07, 2014 4:26 pm 
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The wild bird hypothesis - Questions to the FLI ( PDF ) ? Starting point: As the H5N8 virus come to Europe since the beginning of November has been discovered in the meantime 6 poultry stocks in Europe, a novel avian pathogens, the highly pathogenic influenza virus subtype H5N8 ( HPAI H5N8). It is undisputed that this avian influenza viruses were introduced from South Korea; demonstrate this, among other things genetic comparisons. In South Korea there since January 2014, large numbers of outbreaks especially in duck farms. On the question of how the virus could bridge the gap between East Asia and Europe, there are two hypotheses: a) the viruses were introduced by intercontinental trade contacts between poultry corporations; Wild birds are the victims when viruses are discharged from the poultry flocks. b) the viruses were transported from wild birds to Europe; Poultry farms are the victims, when wild birds enter viruses. The Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut on Riems, the federal institution responsible for animal disease control, takes the latter hypothesis. According to this last winter wild ducks, especially Gluck and the closely related teals and other water birds with avian influenza outbreaks in South Korea have been infected with HPAI H5N8. Million domestic ducks and chickens were slaughtered there. The wild birds carried the virus in the spring to their breeding grounds in Siberia and spread it on there. In the fall they then started in all directions to their moulting and wintering areas, ie. To East Asia, India, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic Coast, North Africa Each bird is contagious during an infection a few days, which means that the virus would have to have multiple passages through the various host birds behind since the beginning of avian influenza outbreaks in Korea. In Europe secretions from infected waterfowl were then randomly somehow entered into poultry houses, which resulted in Germany, Holland and England outbreaks. As far as the thesis of the FLI. This thesis is conclusive as long as it was a confrontation with reality holds. Whether this is the case, it can be checked with the following questions: first Why in winter 2013/2014 numerous water birds died of H5N8, but not in autumn 2014? In South Korea many dead wild ducks (especially lucky ducks) were associated with outbreaks in poultry found that bore the same H5N8 virus as the infected poultry. The virus can thus be proven deadly for waterfowl. Genetically, the H5N8 virus has not changed significantly since the outbreaks in South Korea, but it is not established in the fall of 2014 in the dead water birds. Evidence - so far very few - so far concern only healthy waterfowl (more on this below). What explanation has the FLI for this contradiction? . 2 Why dive H5N8 viruses in East Asia and Western Europe, but not on the big territory between? Infected waterfowl would have spent months in Siberia during the summer of 2014. In Siberian poultry farms and water birds but not H5N8 viruses have been discovered to date, although there are also sought since 2005 specifically for avian influenza viruses. If the virus had arrived with a cargo plane from East Asia to Europe, they would, however, leave no trace in Siberia. Does not this clearly against the wild bird hypothesis and for trade as Einschleppungsweg? . 3 Why the FLI insists on his hypothesis in Arctic waters constitute the origin of the spread of HPAI, although scientific studies involving the FLI (and eg Russian and Dutch researchers) could find no evidence for years? Because there is no direct migratory routes between Asia and Europe are, as is speculated by avian influenza outbreaks in the past, currently you that waters of the Arctic as a virus reservoir and "transfer station" for the transmission of HPAI viruses work. Waters and aquatic birds in Siberia are therefore studied for years with the participation of the FLI and researchers from various countries on avian influenza viruses. However, a circulation of HPAI virus there has not been proven. These results have not been published. Why not? . 4 Siberian water birds wintering in many countries, not only in Europe. Why were infected wild ducks discovered only in the countries where previously there had been in poultry stocks avian influenza outbreaks? Siberian water birds overwinter not only in Europe but also inter alia, in India, on the Black Sea, etc .. In many countries, therefore, is an HPAI monitoring held in waterfowl. An appearance of H5N8 viruses in Europe should have been so predicted. How can it be that H5N8 viruses are so prevalent on the one hand under water birds that they outbreaks in poultry trigger almost simultaneously in distant parts of Europe, and on the other hand go completely unnoticed in the vast majority of waterfowl wintering areas? Is it likely that infected wild birds are found only in the countries where it has previously given avian influenza outbreaks in poultry? This is true not only for Germany and the Netherlands, but also for Japan. . 5 Why are infected waterfowl has not already been discovered earlier in Europe? meet Siberian waterbirds in Europe in the late summer. Teals can be seen on the Mauser courses in August in greater numbers. If they had introduced H5N8 viruses to have this - must make noticeable much earlier - at least among wild birds. How can it be that H5N8 viruses but then come much later, at the same time in different parts of Western Europe in appearance? . 6 Why is there H5N8 outbreaks exclusively in poultry in large, enclosed stalls while kept in free-range poultry spared, although this would need to be exposed to a virus entry much more by wild birds? According to the European Commission, 16 percent of laying hens are kept in the open, in Germany are 42.6% of the laying hen flocks outdoors attitudes (according to the EU, 2012). The current avian influenza outbreaks in poultry relate exclusively stable attitudes, which are secured by Biosecurity measures against the introduction of germs. With previous avian influenza cases almost exclusively in the barn kept poultry was affected. Is it likely that randomly flying around the country wild birds just make such poultry farms that are best protected against this risk? . 7 Why not be made ​​available logs of wild birds sampling and other epidemiological studies public? For years, wild birds and poultry flocks are tested for influenza viruses in Europe. A timely publication takes place only in case of positive findings. Detailed protocols of the studies will also not published, so that a critical review by outsiders is not possible. How is this lack of transparency to agree with the poultry holder of a single positive HPAI or LPAI detection following extensive interference with rights guaranteed by the Constitution (protection of property, inviolability of the home)? . 8 How reliable and meaningful are the evidence of supposedly healthy but H5N8-positive wild birds? During the H5N8 epidemic in South Korean poultry large numbers of dead wild birds were found with these viruses. During the current outbreaks in autumn 2014 have so far been limited to the South Korea and Europe, no dead wild birds were discovered. The hypothesis that viruses circulate among wild birds is based solely on the evidence 2 in Japan (where it is in April 2014, a poultry outbreak was) and the proof in Germany and the Netherlands - each long AFTER outbreaks in poultry farms. You are already therefore less conclusive because the poultry farms come as the source of infection of wild birds in question. Independent evidence for a virus circulation, such as carcasses found that could support these laboratory results do not exist. However, there are several sources of error that can lead to false-positive laboratory results. These include a possible sample contamination in the laboratory or false-positive results at the detection limit. The reliability of laboratory data based solely on the relevant insurance laboratories; verification is not possible, since any lack of transparency. This is a constitutionally questionable condition. . 9 Why are the authorities of the European countries not comment on alternative ways of Vireneinschleppung? While the FLI in the media about wild birds and their role in the introduction of H5N8 speculated other possibilities remain unmentioned. One of the companies affected by any of the current avian influenza outbreaks has or had proven trade relations with South Korean ducks breeding farms. Should there have been contacts during the critical period that could have allowed a virus transmission (of any transport of poultry, transportation or other material), this would be considered obvious-the-art transmission - also when the final proof humanly but impossible expected. Why is there no opinion to the authorities? As the FLI estimates that possibility?

http://www.wai.netzwerk-phoenix.net/ind ... edit&id=86

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