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INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (H1N1) 2009 (58): THE NETHERLANDS, PB2 MUTATION ****************************************************************** A ProMED-mail post <http://www.promedmail.org> ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases <http://www.isid.org>
Date: Mon 28 Sep 2009 From: Marion Koopmans <Marion.Koopmans@rivm.nl>
We would like to report 2 patients in The Netherlands, diagnosed with influenza pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 virus infection that had a mutation (E627K) in the basic polymerase 2 (PB2) protein. This mutation has previously been associated with increased efficiency of replication and possible virulence changes in other influenza A viruses.
The investigation identified a specific geographic region in the north of The Netherlands as the place where viruses with the same genetic background have circulated between mid July and mid August [2009]. No other cases carrying the PB2 mutation have been identified.
On 15 Sep 2009, the 1st influenza A(H1N1)v virus with a glutamic acid to lysine mutation at position 627 (E627K) in PB2 was identified through routine sequence analysis of clinical samples from a diabetic patient infected with A(H1N1)v virus. The 1st day of illness was on 9 Aug 2009, when the patient was vacationing on one of the West Frisian Islands in the wetlands north of The Netherlands (Waddenzee). He had a relatively mild course of illness. Subsequent retrospective tracing of geographically linked A(H1N1)v cases from the national databases led to the identification of 24 additional A(H1N1)v confirmed cases throughout the country that had stayed on the same popular holiday island during July and August. Sequence analysis of 12/24 clinical specimen available at the institute identified 10 A(H1N1)v viruses that clustered with the virus obtained from the diabetic index patient based on unique mutations in the NA gene and PB2 gene. Only one of these had the PB2 E627K mutation. This virus was isolated from a family contact of an adolescent girl who returned from a one-week stay on the same island on Mon 20 Jul 2009 with high fever and coughing. This girl had been camping with a group of 16 boys and 8 girls that shared 2 tents. Almost all members of this group reportedly had been ill, and influenza A(H1N1)v infection had been diagnosed in 2 other persons belonging to the same camp. The girl was ill for a week, with full recovery after 2 weeks. Our 2nd case with a virus shedding carrying the PB2 mutation is the younger sister and became ill on Thu 23 Jul 2009. She was treated with oseltamivir and recovered fully after one week. Both parents remained free from symptoms.
As the mutations were identified more than one month after initial detection, no further contact investigations were done. Municipal health services were informed about the local disease activity. Since 15 Aug 2009, mild influenza cases are no longer notifiable in The Netherlands, so we have no information on possible onward transmission. No clusters of illness (for example, from schools) were reported in the health regions involved (including the island), and surveillance data from a national physician-based sentinel network showed low ILI activity for the Netherlands. Samples from 22 patients hospitalized with influenza A(H1N1) in July and August did not have the PB2 mutation.
PB2 627K is consistently found in human influenza A viruses, but rarely in avian-derived viruses. The E627K mutation may result in enhanced virus replication efficiency in humans, possibly by adjustment to host body temperature or cellular cofactors, and has previously been shown to be associated with fatal cases of HPAI H5N1 and H7N7 virus infection in humans. Until now, A(H1N1)v viruses with Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (57): in PB2 have not been reported, and the clinical and epidemiological relevance of our finding remains unclear.
Preliminary experiments in ferrets using reverse genetics-derived new influenza A(H1N1)v viruses with the E267K mutation in PB2 did not indicate increased shedding, virulence or transmissibility. Further experiments as well as increased molecular surveillance to monitor the situation are ongoing.
[byline: M Jonges 1, A Meijer 1, J van Steenbergen 2, T Oomen 2, H Vennema 1, J Spaargaren 3, Kampman 4, P van der Tas 5, R Ter Schegget 6, Wim van der Hoek 7, J Tjie 8, R Benne 9, Sander Herfst 10, Salin Chutinimitkul 10, Ab Osterhaus 10, Ron Fouchier 10, Marion Koopmans 1, 10. At: 1 National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Centre for Infectious Disease Control, PO Box 1, 3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands 2 Preparedness and response unit, Center for infectious disease control, Bilthoven 3 Laboratory for Microbiology, Enschede 4 Municipal Health Service, Twente 5 Municipal Health Service, Friesland 6 Municipal health service, Brabant 7 Epidemiology and surveillance unit, Center for infectious disease control, Bilthoven 8 Microbiological laboratory Veldhoven 9 Laboratory for infectious diseases, Groningen 10 Laboratory for Virology, ErasmusMC, Rotterdam]
-- communicated by: Marion Koopmans Chief of Virology Laboratory for Infectious Diseases and Screening, Center for Infectious Disease Control National Institute of Public Health The Netherlands <Marion.Koopmans@rivm.nl>
[ProMED-mail thanks Dr Koopmans and colleagues for providing this interesting information recording the detection of the same E267K mutation in the basic polymerase 2 (PB2) protein of 2 independent isolates of A(H1N1)v in the north of The Netherlands. The functional relevance of this mutation remains to be determined. - Mod.CP]
[see also: Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (57): case counts 20090925.3367 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (56): antiviral resistance risk 20090925.3363 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (55): vaccine formulation 20090925.3359 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (54): vaccine availability 20090921.3325 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (53): vaccine donation 20090919.3290 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (52): WHO update 66 20090918.3272 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (51): antibody deficiency 20090917.3261 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (50): oseltamivir-resistance 20090917.3260 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (40): global update 20090906.3138 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (30): assumptions 20090813.2879 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (20): Peru, 33 percent asymptomatic 20090730.2668 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (10): vaccine 20090720.2577 Influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009 - Viet Nam: patient data 20090708.2450]
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